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Abstract
Health care ofﬁcials are increasingly concerned with know-
ing early whether an outbreak of a particular disease is un-
folding. We often have daily counts of some variable that are
indicative of the number of individuals in a given community
becoming sick each day with a particular disease. By moni-
toring these daily counts we can possibly detect an outbreak
in an early stage. A number of classical time-series methods
have been applied to outbreak detection based on monitor-
ing daily counts of some variables. These classical methods
only give us an alert as to whether there may be an outbreak.
They do not predict properties of the outbreak such as its
size, duration, and how far we are into the outbreak. Know-
ing the probable values of these variables can help guide us
to a cost-effective decision that maximizes expected utility.
Bayesian networks have become one of the most prominent
architectures for reasoning under uncertainty in artiﬁcial in-
telligence. We present an intelligent system, implemented us-
ing a Bayesian network, which not only detects an outbreak,
but predicts its size and duration, and estimates how far we
are into the outbreak. We show results of investigating the
performance of the system using simulated outbreaks based
on real outbreak data. These results indicate that the system
shows promise of being able to predict properties of an out-
break.
Introduction
(Le Strat and Carrat 1999) deﬁne an epidemic as ‘the oc-
currence of a number of cases of a disease, in a given pe-
riod of time in a given population, that exceed the expected
number.’ (Last 2000) deﬁnes an outbreak as ‘an epidemic
limited to localizedincrease, e.g., in a village, town, or insti-
tution.’ Health care departments are increasingly concerned
with knowing early whether an outbreak of a particular dis-
ease is unfolding. If we can detect an outbreak and estimate
its potential cost early, we can take appropriate measures
(relative to its potential cost) to control it. An epidemic
curve (epi curve) is a graphical depiction of the number of
outbreakcases by dateof onsetof illness. Figure1 (a)shows
an epi curve constructed from a sample of the populationaf-
fected by a Cryptosporidium outbreak in North Battleford,
Saskatchewan in spring, 2001. In Figure 1 (a) the counts up
Copyright c  2006, American Association for Artiﬁcial Intelli-
gence (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved.
Figure 1: An epi curve for a Cryptosporidium outbreak in
North Battleford is in (a), while weekly OTC sales of an-
tidiarrheal drugs at one pharmacy in North Battleford is in
(b). These curves were constructed from data obtained from
(Paulson 2001).
until about March 20 are background counts, which are the
counts when no outbreak is taking place.
Theepicurveforanoutbreakis oftenmirroredinthedaily
counts of some observable variable(s). Consider again the
epi curve for the Cryptosporidium outbreakshown in Figure
1 (a). Cryptosporidium infection causes diarrhea. Figure
1 (b) show the weekly over-the-counter (OTC) sales of an-
tidiarrheal drugs at one pharmacy in North Battleford. The
correlation between these two curves indicates that by mon-
itoring OTC sales of such drugs we can possibly detect a
Cryptosporidium outbreak in an early stage, and then take
some preventative measure such as issuance of a boil water
alert.
A number of classical time-series methods have been ap-
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1155plied to outbreak detection. Many are reviewed in (Wong
and Moore 2006). A simple method is to take the mean µ
and standard deviation σ of the background daily counts,
and issue an alert whenever the daily sales exceed µ by kσ,
where k is usually 2 or 3. (Wong and Moore 2006) discuss
problems with this simple approach and improvements to it.
The classical methods only give us an alert as to whether
there may be an outbreak. They do not predict important
properties of the outbreak such as its size and its duration,
and they do not estimate how far into the outbreak we are.
Knowing the probable values of these variables can help
guide us to a decision that maximizes expected utility. We
developed a Bayesian network model for an intelligent sys-
tem that detects outbreaks and predicts their properties. It
addresses this problem. Speciﬁcally, the network contains
nodes/variablesfortheduration,size, anddayssincetheout-
break began.
In the next section we brieﬂy review Bayesian networks.
Then we present the general Bayesian network model for
outbreak detection/prediction. After that, we use the model
to developa system that detects Cryptosporidium outbreaks,
and we show results of experiments using the system.
Bayesian Networks
If we create a DAG (directed acyclic graph) G whose nodes
are random variables, and assume the probability distribu-
tion P of the variables in the DAG satisﬁes the Markov con-
dition with G, we say we are making the Markov assump-
tion, and (G,P) is called a Bayesian network (Neapolitan
2004). A probability distribution P satisﬁes the Markov
condition with a DAG G if the probability of each variable
in the DAG is independentof its nondescendentsconditional
on its parents. There are arguments that a causal DAG sat-
isﬁes the Markov assumption with the variables in the DAG
(See (Pearl 2000).) It is a theorem that if P satisﬁes the
Markov condition with G, then P is equal to the product of
its conditional distributions in G. So in a Bayesian network
wespecifytheprobabilitydistributionbyshowingthecondi-
tionaldistributions. Efﬁcientinferencealgorithmshavebeen
developedfor a largeclass of Bayesian networks. Inparticu-
lar, inference is usually efﬁcient if the network is sparse. By
‘inference’ we mean we can compute the conditional prob-
ability of one or more variables given values of other vari-
ables. A dynamic Bayesian network is a Bayesian network
that explicitly models discrete time. There is a Bayesian
network for each time slice, and transition edges and prob-
abilities that relate variable values at a given point in time
to values at previous points in time. Efﬁcient inference al-
gorithms for dynamic Bayesian networks exist for a special
subclass of networks (See (Neapolitan 2004).).
A Bayesian Network for Outbreak
Detection/Prediction
Our intelligent system for outbreak detection represents the
problem using a Bayesian network. The general Bayesian
network structure for an outbreak detection system appears
in Figure 2. We do not show the network as a dynamic
Bayesian network for two reasons: 1) We feel it is more
Figure 2: A Bayesian network for outbreak detec-
tion/prediction.
lucid to show it as illustrated; 2) In its most general form the
dynamic Bayesian network would not be of the type which
allows efﬁcient inference. The system would try to predict
whether an outbreak of disease X is in progress, along with
properties of the outbreak, based on daily counts of variable
M. Next we describe each variable in the network.
1. O: This variable represents the number of days ago an
outbreak started. It’s value is 0 if an outbreak has not
started in the previous durmax days, where durmax is
the maximum duration of an outbreak of this type.
2. D: The variable D represents the duration of an outbreak
that started some time in the previous durmax days. It
depends on O because if O is 0, D must be 0.
3. G: The binary variable G represents whether there is an
ongoing outbreak today. It depends on O and D because
it is 1 if and only if D ≥ O > 0.
4. S: This is the size of the outbreak, which is the percent
of the population that eventually becomes ill due to the
outbreak if no measures are taken to control it. It depends
on G because if G is 0, S must be 0.
5. OC[i]: This is the count of variable M owing to individ-
uals who are sick due to the outbreak. OC[0] is the count
today, and OC[i] is the count i days before today. It de-
pendsonS andD becauselargeroutbreaksresultinlarger
counts. It depends on O because, during an outbreak, the
number of sick individuals increases, as the outbreak pro-
gresses, to some peak, and then decreases.
6. Day: This variable represents the day of the week.
7. C: Thisvariablerepresentssomecyclicalaffectotherthan
day of the week. There could be more than one such vari-
able depending on the application.
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11568. H: This variable represents hidden common causes of
variable M. It mitigates the relationship between daily
counts that are not due to the outbreak. This is not the
only way to mitigate this relationship. For example, in a
given application it may be best to model it with edges
between the variables representingdaily counts. (Cheese-
man and Stutz 1995) developed AutoClass to learn the
range of variables like H from data.
9. BC[i]: This is the count of variable M today owing to in-
dividuals who are not sick due to the outbreak. This vari-
able depends on H because, for example, it has a higher
probability of being large when H is in its high state. It
dependsonDay andC becausewe canhavedifferentdis-
tributions on different days of the week and in different
periods of a cycle.
10. TC[i]: This is the total count of variable M. It depends
on OC[i] and BC[i] because it is the sum of these values.
An Application
Next we present an application of the model just described
to a system that detects/predicts outbreaks of Cryptosporid-
ium infection in Cook County, Illinois. Cryptosporidium is
a water-borne infection that causes diarrhea. The variable
observed in the system is OTC sales of antidiarrheal drugs.
First we describe the conditional probability distributions in
the system.
1. O: We assume that there should be a Cryptosporidium
outbreak about once every 30 years, and that the duration
of suchoutbreaksis uniformlydistributedbetween21 and
56 days. Since such outbreaks are so rare, for simplicity
we assume there could be at most one in the past 56 days.
Therefore, P(O = 0) = 1 − 56/(30 × 365) and P(O =
i) = 1/(30× 365) for 1 ≤ i ≤ 56.
2. D: If O = 0 , P(D = 0) = 1; otherwise D is uniformly
distributed between 21 and 56.
3. G: If O = 0 or D ≤ O, P(G = 0) = 1; otherwise
P(G = 1) = 1.
4. S: If G = 0, P(S = 0) = 1; otherwise S is uniformly
distributed over all integers between 1% and 50%.
5. OC[i]: WeassumethatepicurvesforallCryptosporidium
outbreaks have the same general shape, and therefore the
corresponding curves of OTC sales of antidiarrheal drugs
have the same general shape. Figure 3 shows epi curves
for the North Battleford, Saskatchewan Cryptosporidium
outbreak in spring, 2001 and the Milwaukee, Wisconsin
Cryptosporidium outbreak in spring, 1993. Note that al-
though the outbreaks have different durations, they have
the same general shape. Making this assumption, we de-
veloped a probability distribution for OC[0] given values
of O, D, and S as follows.
We ﬁrst smoothed the function representing daily OTC
sales of antidiarrheal medication during some actual out-
break to obtain a function g(t) whose domain includes
all numbers between 1 and the duration D of that out-
break. We chose the North Battleford outbreak men-
tioned above, and smoothed the sales curve for Pharmacy
Figure 3: An epi curve for the North Battleford,
Saskatchewan Cryptosporidium outbreak in spring, 2001 is
in (a), while oneforthe Milwaukee, Wisconsin Cryptospror-
idium outbreak in spring, 1993 is in (b). The curves were
respectively constructed from data obtained from (Paulson
2001) and (Mac Kenzie, Hoxie, and Proctor 1994).
A obtained from (Paulson 1994). Next we let DN and
SN be the duration and size of the North Battleford out-
break, BN be the average daily background OTC counts
in Pharmacy A in North Battleford, and BC be the aver-
agedailybackgroundOTC countsinthepharmaciesmon-
itoredin Cook County. Theirvaluesare DN = 47, SN =
35.8%, BN = 1.973, and BC = 986. Then we set
µ(O,D,S)
=
BC × DN × S
BN × D × SN
× g

(DN − 1)(O − 1)
D − 1
+ 1

=
986 × 47 × S
1.973× D × 35.8
× g

46(O − 1)
D − 1
+ 1

. (1)
For given values of S and D, the result is a function of
O whose shape is like g(t) but with duration D, size S,
and scaled to Cook County. This formula was developed
by (Wallstrom 2006), who offers a formal justiﬁcation for
it. Intuitively, BC/BN scales the function to a different
sizedcommunity,DN/D scales thefunctionto adifferent
duration,S/SN scales the function to a differentsize, and
the expression in the argument of g changes the domain
of the function from [1,DN] to [1,D].
Given values of S and D, the function µ is a scaled
replica of g. We inserted random ﬂuctuation by letting
u be the mean of a negative binomial distribution. We
set the dispersion of that distribution equal to 3.52. This
value is consistent with the variances we discovered for
the backgroundcounts.
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1157Figure 4: AMOC curves for BayesNet applied to Cryp-
tosporidium simulated outbreaks. For each size there were
30 simulations.
6. In this application there is a single variable C that indi-
cates certainholidays. Speciﬁcally,the variablewas given
the value ‘high’ during the 4 days following July 4th and
the days from December 26 through January 3.
7. H: Based on manualinspection, we determinedthreeval-
ues (low, medium, and high) for backgroundsales data of
antidiarrheal medicine in Cook County.
8. BC[i]: For each combination of values of H, Day, and
C, we computed a mean and variance of the counts on
all days correspondingto those values. We then made the
conditional distribution a negative binomial distribution
with this mean and variance.
Experiments
We investigated both the detection capability and estimation
capability of the system.
Experiment 1
The ﬁrst experiment investigated how well the system de-
tects outbreaks.
Method It is difﬁcult to test outbreak detection systems
because there are so few outbreaks. To address this prob-
lem, (Wallstrom, Wagner, and Hogan 2005) developed HI-
FIDE, which is a system that simulates outbreaks. In par-
ticular, the system can simulate OTC sales of antidiarrheal
medication sold during Cryptosporidium outbreaks of var-
ious sizes. The simulated data are based on data obtained
during an outbreak of Cryptosporidium in North Battleford.
When analyzing outbreak detection algorithms, simulations
are ordinarilybased only on assumptions about the nature of
an outbreak. HIFIDE brings the evaluation one step closer
to reality by basing the simulations on a real outbreak.
Using HIFIDE, (Wallstrom, Wagner, and Hogan 2005)
evaluated a number of classical outbreak detection sys-
tems by injecting simulated Cryptosporidium outbreaks into
Cook County data between 5/1/2004 and 9/30/2004. So that
Detection Algorithm Size = 5% Size = 10%
BayesNet 16.77 13.50
DMSA 19.71 13.55
ARIMA 18.74 14.24
EWMA w = .01 16.11 13.44
EWMA w = .30 28.72 15.70
CuS-EWMA w = .01 14.34 12.63
CuS-EWMA w = .05 17.16 14.82
CuS-EWMA w = .30 28.62 16.34
Table 1: Mean day of detection with annual false alarm rate
equal to 4.
we could compare results of the Bayesian model to the clas-
sical methods we simulated outbreaks during that same pe-
riod. In this way, althoughthe actual simulated data was dif-
ferent, the background counts were the same. The Bayesian
network was learned once before the simulations. We simu-
latedoutbreaksofduration47days(Thisis theonlyduration
provided by the simulator.) and sizes 5%, 10%, 20%, and
40%. For each size, we did 30 simulations spaced evenly
throughout the background period. We used a system that
maintained today’s count and the counts on the previous 5
days. We call this system BayesNet. The system was devel-
oped using Netica (http://www.norsys.com/). Inference us-
ing Netica took less than 1 second. We issued an alert when
the posterior probability of an ongoing outbreak exceeded
some threshold. We used AMOC curves to evaluate our re-
sults (Fawcett and Provost 1999). In such curves the annual
false positive rate is plotted on the x-axis and the mean day
of detection on the y-axis.
Results Figure 4 shows AMOC curves for our simulated
outbreaks. As would be expected, the detection time de-
creases as the size of the outbreak increases.
Table 1 compares the results for BayesNet to the results
(Wallstrom, Wagner, and Hogan 2005) obtained for various
classical methods. The results are only for outbreaks of size
5% and 10% because they did not simulate larger outbreaks.
We see that BayesNet compares favorably with these meth-
ods. Furthermore,we could have tried differentvalues of the
dispersion (Similar to how some classical methods use dif-
ferent weights.) to possibly improve our results, but we did
not do this. Figures 5 and 6 comparethe results of BayesNet
to those of CuSum-EWMA (w = .05).
We were able to detect outbreaks earlier using a system
that maintainedtoday’s count and the counts on the previous
20 days. We call this system BayesNet2. We used BayesNet
inthecomparisonsaboveso thattheAMOC curvetechnique
would compare the system more favorably to the classical
methods. BayesNet2 would not compare as favorably due
to the following two limitations of AMOC curves: First,
suppose that at some threshold a detection system issues an
alarm on 3 consecutive days based on certain counts. If we
raise the threshold, we might get an alert only on the ﬁrst
day given these same counts. If there is no outbreak, the lat-
terresult is preferablebecausewe havefewerfalse positives.
However, if there is an outbreak, the former result is prefer-
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1158Figure 5: AMOC curves for BayesNet and CuSum-EWMA
(w = .05) for simulated outbreaks of size 5%.
Figure 6: AMOC curves for BayesNet and CuSum-EWMA
(w = .05) for simulated outbreaks of size 10%.
able because the latter one gives us the false conﬁdence on
days two and three that an outbreak is not taking place. So
it is not clear which threshold is preferable. AMOC curves
only reward systems for the initial day of detection; so they
favor the second threshold. The second limitation has to do
with systems such as BayesNet which do more than sim-
ply issue an alert. Suppose there is no outbreak going on,
and the backgroundconditions appear like a small outbreak.
On some initial day BayesNet would issue an alert an out-
break is ongoing, on the next day it would still issue an alert
but say we are further into the outbreak, and so on. These
would all be considered false positives. This problem hurt
BayesNet2 in the evaluationbecause the system would track
a false small outbreak throughout much of its duration.
Experiment 2
In this experiment we investigated how well the system es-
timates and predicts the size (S), duration (D), and days the
outbreak has been ongoing (O).
Size Av S Er S Av D Er D Av O Er O
5% 13.55 2.05 43.96 .09 7.04 .56
10% 17.23 .95 43.73 .11 9.43 .83
20% 20.98 .46 44.49 .12 13.75 .81
40% 28.03 .38 45.40 .10 15.34 .65
Table 2: Estimates on the 13th day of the outbreak. The
correct value of D is 47 and that of O is 13.
Size Av S Er S Av D Er D Av O Er O
20% 20.26 .40 45.03 .15 20.15 .13
40% 40.00 .13 47.03 .06 20.90 .04
Table 3: Estimates on the 21st day of the outbreak. The
correct value of D is 47 and that of O is 21.
Method We used BayesNet2 for this experiment. There
were 30 simulations each of sizes 5%, 10%, 20% and 40%.
All simulated outbreaks had a duration of 47 days.
Results On a given day of a given simulation, BayesNet2
reports expected values of S, D, and O. Table 2 shows the
average (over all 30 simulations) of these values on the 13th
day of the simulated outbreaks. The estimates are condi-
tioned on an outbreak taking place. The error (Er) show in
that table is the ratio of the square root of the mean square
error to the correct value. For example, if the size is 5%
Er S =
qP30
i=1(Si − 5)2
5
,
where Si is the expected value of the size reported for the
ith simulation. We see that by the 13th day the estimates
for size 20% and size 40% outbreaks are fairly good, while
those for smaller outbreaks are not. Tables 3 and 4 show
that by the 21st day the estimates for size 20% and size 40%
outbreaks are quite accurate, as are those for size 5% and
size 10% outbreaks by the 25th day.
Figure 7 shows how, in general, the average size estimate
improves as we proceed further into the outbreak. Notice
that something odd happens in the case of small outbreaks.
Namely, at about the time we could actually detect a small
outbreak, the average estimate moves in the direction of be-
ingtoolarge. Thisis becauseasmalloutbreakondays10-18
looks much like a larger outbreak on an earlier day.
Discussion
The model presented here is an initial attempt at a system
that not only detects outbreaks, but also estimates properties
of outbreaks. Our results indicate that it shows promise of
being able to estimate these properties.
Size Av S Er S Av D Er D Av O Er O
5% 5.48 .47 45.69 .13 24.30 .11
10% 10.43 .52 44.54 .33 23.41 .16
Table 4: Estimates on the 25th day of the outbreak. The
correct value of D is 47 and that of O is 25.
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1159Figure 7: Number of days the outbreak is ongoing is plotted
on the x-axis, and the average size estimate is plotted on the
y-axis.
Limitations and Future Research
Recall that we obtained the conditional distributions of
counts due to the outbreak from data obtained during the
North Battleford outbreak, and we evaluated the system us-
ing HIFIDE, whose simulations are based on data obtained
during that same outbreak. Although such techniques are
often used to evaluate detection algorithms, the question re-
mains as to what the performance would be if the model
were applied to real data. Recall further that the model as-
sumes epicurvesforall Cryptosporidiumoutbreakshavethe
same hape. Both these matters bear further investigation.
In the case of small outbreaks, the predictions become
worse before they become better. It seems that they are
sometimes confused with larger outbreaks owing to the fact
that outbreak counts during the early days of a small out-
break are quite small. BayesNet2 is memory intensive and
the simulations were run on a computer with only 1/2 giga-
bytes of memory. So it was necessary to maintain counts
that were rounded to the nearest 50. The simulations need
to be run on a larger computer to see if the results improve.
However, it may be that in general it simply is not possible
to distinguish small outbreaks on day 13 or so from larger
outbreaks at an earlier stage. If this is the case, we still have
useful information to provide to the epidemiologist. That is,
if a largeoutbreakis detected,we can state that ‘it appearsto
be a large outbreak in an early stage, but it could be a small
outbreak at a later stage. We will know more soon.’
The system described here could readily be modiﬁed to
handle multivariate times series. Finally, epidemiologists
may not be as interested in the potential size and duration
of the outbreak as they would be in the potential epi curve.
Future research could investigate estimating the epi curve
from the estimates of the size and duration.
Related Research
BARD (Hogan et al. 2004) uses a Bayesian network to de-
tect and characterize outbreaks of anthrax due to dispersion
of B. anthracis spores. It also estimates properties of an out-
break. Speciﬁcally, it estimates the geographic scope of an
outbreak and the mass of spores released. However, it is de-
signed for a speciﬁc type of outbreak,and does not make the
predictions discussed here. PANDA (Cooper et al. 2004)
is a detection algorithm that models each individual in the
population with a Bayesian network. However, it does not
predict the properties of an outbreak discussed here.
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